物流管理专业研讨会

（2018年第1期）

【时间】2018年3月29日（周四）晚7：00－9：00

【地点】经济管理学院4楼会议室

【主讲】尤壮壮

【主题】Optimal Production Decision for the OEM under a Stackelberg Game: Impacts of customers’ perceived value.

【摘要】In many cases, consumers may value a remanufactured product less than a new version, so it is significant for the manufacturer to make a decision on whether to remanufacture or not. In this paper, we built two leader-follower Stackelberg game models to investigate the impact of consumers’ perceived value of the OEM new and remanufactured products on a competitive market system’s optimal production management, and in which the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is a leader while the third-party remanufacturer (TPR) is a follower. Specifically, in our system consisting of one OEM and one TPR, we consider a manufacturer who has two options: (1) the OEM only produces new products and the presence of TPR’s remanufactured products improves the perceived value of new products, (2) the OEM chooses to enter the remanufacturing market and competes with the TPR, where the perceived value of new product is unchanged. Among our results, the impact of consumers’ perceived value and remanufacturing cost on optimization production decision for the OEM are examined under two competitive scenarios. We find that there exists a threshold on customer's perceived value of new products, below which it is a profitable alternative for the OEM to engage in remanufacturing. Particularly, our study indicates that the OEM would take the initiative to remanufacture for pursuing more profit only if the remanufacturing cost is sufficiently low. In addition, we find that the higher willingness-to-pay for the OEM-remanufactured products may be harmful for the OEM. 

【主讲人介绍】尤壮壮

Employment: 安徽师范大学经济管理学院，物流管理2015级本科生.

Research Interests: 生产运营管理，博弈论，再制造与逆向物流

Supervisor：方昶